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ABSTRACT
In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by ﬁrms that
compete à la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission
permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permit prices may increase
after clean technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic ﬁrms are
able to predict such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for
very low adoption costs). To the light of the previous result, we ﬁnd a sufﬁcient
condition for the cap on emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
Herein we assess the incentives to invest in clean technologies of polluting ﬁrms with
market power in their local output market, who participate in a region-wide tradable
emissions permits (TEP) market. Firms compete à la Cournot producing a homogenous
good and emissions as a by-product.1 Due to such emissions, ﬁrms are subject to an
environmental regulation that consists of the creation of a number of tradable emission
permits that are then freely allocated to ﬁrms by each country regulator. Since permits
are tradable, ﬁrms buy/sell permits in order to hold one permit per unit of emissions, at
the end of the period.
This description corresponds to the way that sectors subject to international compe-
tition in the European Union (EU) are regulated via the EU-Emission Trading Scheme
(ETS): to comply with the EU-wide CO2 emission reduction objective (8%) established
by the Kyoto Protocol, national allocation plans (NAPs) are established.2 Those NAPs,
after the EU Commission’s approval, reﬂect the burden sharing rules decided through
negotiation. In accordance with each NAP, each government allocates permits among
ﬁrms operating in the country, permits that can then be traded internationally. Some
of the ﬁrms receiving permits have market power in their local market, e.g., electricity
utilities, but are price takers in the region-wide EU-ETS where ﬁrms from outside their
local market participate. Those ﬁrms, all together, can push up or down the price of
permits according to their behavior in the local output market. In such case, their inter-
action in the output market may inﬂuence the outcome in the permits market, even if
due to the relative small size of the local output market in relation to the region-wide
emissions market, they do not consider the possibility of exerting any inﬂuence in the
permits market.
Regarding the investment decision, we suppose that ﬁrms can choose to produce with
their (dirty) technology or to invest in a clean technology that decreases emission’s inten-
sity of output. Such deﬁnition of environmental innovation is inspired by Bréchet and
Jouvet (2008) and it is very appropriate in the case of pollutants with the characteristics
of CO2, in which emission reduction can be best achieved by input substitution or by a
more general change in the production process itself as opposed to investing in end-of-
pipe technology.3 We model the choice of technology as follows: in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms
choose the production technology and, in the second stage, they choose output produc-
tion, and consequently, the number of permits to buy/sell.4 We focus on the analysis of
fulﬁlled expectations equilibria5 (FEE) resulting from the game to derive the conditions
for having positive innovation incentives. The structure of the model is inspired by the
1 This can be due to the use of a polluting input or due to a polluting production process itself.
2 http://www.ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/implementation_en.htm.
3 Most literature on environmental innovation is concerned with end-of-pipe innovation (see for
example Requate and Unold, 2003), which is not the most commonly used in the case of CO2
reduction.
4 This sequence of decisions follows the rule of the less irreversible decision.
5 This concept, derived from Katz and Shapiro (1985), will be clariﬁed in the following section.
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technology-linked-markets setup proposed by Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006, 2008) and
the innovation game is inspired by Gabszewicz and Garella (1995) when modelling the
decision of internalizing the production of an intermediate good.
Most of the literature on environmental innovation is devoted to the comparison of
the innovation incentives under alternative pollution control rules. With the exception
of Montero (2002), in general this literature considers the output market as competitive
(Parry, 1998; Requate, 1998). Montero (2002) deﬁnes innovation as investing in an R&D
sector, which produces a (proportional) decrease in the separable cost of abatement per
unit ofR&D invested. In this context, he studies the impact of strategic interactions in the
output market on innovation incentives when the market for tradable emission permits
is cleared through (Nash) bargaining between two strategic ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that one
ﬁrm’s innovation decreases permits prices which, on one hand, reduces its production
costs (direct effect) but, on the other hand, increases competition in the output market
(strategic effect) due to the decrease in the rival’s production costs. The incentives to
innovate then depend on the net effect. Herein, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011), the direct
effect may be by itself positive or negative and therefore may add-up to the strategic
effect. In this context, we show how innovation incentives depend on ﬁrms position
in the permits market, on the rate of region-wide innovation and on output strategic
interaction in the local markets, which in turn are a function of the constraint imposed by
the cap. In particular, the cap on emissions will be more or less restrictive depending on
the elasticity of output demand and, together with the increase on emissions efﬁciency
due to the new technology, will determine whether the price of permits increases or not
after innovation (Sanin and Zanaj, 2011). This last effect will beneﬁt sellers or buyers,
determiningwhether an innovation equilibrium arises or not. To the light of the previous
result, we ﬁnd a condition for the cap on emissions considered in each NAP to ensure
positive innovation incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we present the assumptions
and solve the sequential game played by the ﬁrms. In “Equilibria analysis” section we
analyze equilibria and discuss the importance of the cap on emissions to induce an
innovation equilibrium. The last section concludes.
THE MODEL
Inspired by the organization of the EU-ETS, we assume that there are n identical
countries subject to a region-wide cap on emissions nS. All countries are assumed to be
identical: each country, according to its NAP, allocates an amount S of permits for free
to ﬁrms operating in its local market. Assume there are two strategic ﬁrms producing
a homogenous good in each local market and that the production of the good generates
emissions as a by-product. A percentage α of S is allocated to ﬁrm i and a percentage
(1 − α) is allocated to ﬁrm j. These percentages are common knowledge. If permits
received are not enough (or more than enough) to produce optimal output, ﬁrms trade
in the market for permits (locally or regionally).
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We assume that ﬁrms play a Cournot game in the local output market producing
good y. Their technology is given by
y = KlE, l = i, j (1)
where E stands for emissions (or use of permits) and Kl is ﬁrm’s l productivity of
emissions. Without innovation, emission’s productivity is Kl = 1, l = i, j.6 Firms can
choose to implement a clean technology, i.e., a technology that would increase emission’s
productivity to K , with 2 ≥ K > 1, paying a ﬁxed cost F.7
The choice of technology is modelled as a two-stages game: in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms
simultaneously choose their production technology given their expectations regarding
the level of adoption in the region (and consequently their expected price of permits qe).
Such choice is done by comparing their proﬁts in the output market and in the permits
market when using the clean technology (after paying the ﬁxed cost of implementationF)
as opposed to using the dirty technology. In the second stage ﬁrms choose how much to
produce y∗ and trade permits to maximize proﬁts. We ﬁnd the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria (SPNE) that are fulﬁlled expectations equilibria using backward induction.
In our setup, a fulﬁlled expectation equilibrium is a permit market equilibrium (and
the corresponding output market solution) in which the expectations of ﬁrms about the
permit price are accomplished at the equilibrium of the game. As in Katz and Shapiro
(1985), we ﬁnd the conditions for an innovation (non-innovation or partial adoption)
equilibrium to arise in a local market when ﬁrms expect a region-wide innovation (non-
innovation or partial adoption) equilibrium and its corresponding permits price.8
Second Stage: Cournot-Nash Production Game
Given the technology choice done in the previous stage and linear output demand, proﬁts
of ﬁrms are
i(Ki ,Kj , qe) = (1 − KiEi − KjEj)KiEi − qe(Ei − αS); (2)
j(Ki ,Kj , qe) = (1 − KiEi − KjEj)KjEj − qe(Ej − (1 − α)S). (3)
where Ki ,Kj ∈ {1,K}, 1 ≤ K ≤ 2, α ∈ (0, 12 ) and where qe is the expected permits
price.
After computing the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) and solving the system of equations
we ﬁnd the optimal use of permits
Ei(Ki ,Kj , qe) = qe Ki − 2Kj
3K2i Kj
+ 1
3Ki
; (4)
6 We could think of a relationship between the amount of input x used for production and emissions
E of the type E = 1k x. Solving for x, we would obtain the technological relation between emissions
and output in (1).
7 We shall restrict 1 ≤ K ≤ 2 to ensures the existence of equilibrium in the permits market by
yielding positively sloped supply of permits.
8 Nonetheless, we analyse the sets of parameters where an FEE does not exist in Appendix B.
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Ej(Ki ,Kj , qe) = qe Kj − 2Ki
3KiK2j
+ 1
3Kj
. (5)
The corresponding proﬁts are
πi(Ki ,Kj , qe) = q
e(KiKj (2Ki−4Kj−4qe+9SαKiKj )+qe(K2i +4K2j ))+K2i K2j
9K2j K
2
i
;
πj(Ki ,Kj , qe) = q
e(KiKj (2Kj−4Ki−4qe+9SKiKj (1−α))+qe(K2j +4K2i ))+K2i K2j
9K2j K
2
i
.
(6)
First Stage: Technology Adoption Game
Herein we derive the Nash equilibria in the technology adoption game for given expec-
tations on other ﬁrms’ adoption and consequently on qe.
No ﬁrm adopts if and only if (iff) F ≥ πl (K , 1, qe) − πl (1, 1, qe) ≡ F0(qe),l = i, j;
both ﬁrms adopt iff F ≤ πl (K ,K , qe) − πl (1,K , qe) ≡ F2(qe), l = i, j; and only one
ﬁrm adopts iff F2(qe) ≤ F ≤ F0(qe), with
F0(qe) = 4(q
e − K)(1 − K)qe
9K2
;
F2(qe) = 4(1 − K)q
e(qe − qeK − K + qeK)
9K2
.
(7)
Each ﬁrm participates in the market for permits as a buyer or a seller depending on the
difference between their needs of permits for production, summarized in (4) and (5), and
the endowment of permits they received for free, αS or (1− α)S, respectively in each of
the n local markets. Since we consider that all local markets in the region are identical, the
previous implies that total supply (or demand) of permits is n
(
αS − (qeKi−2qeKj+KiKj )
3K2i Kj
)
while region-wide demand (or supply) is n
(
(qeKj−2qeKi+KiKj )
3KiK2j
− (1−α)S
)
. The demand
and supply of permits come from many industries and these industries are assumed to
be of the same numerosity.
Equalizing demand with supply in the market for permits yields the price of permits
q∗2 =
1
2
K (2 − 3KS) ;
q∗1 =
1
2
K (3SK − K − 1)
K − K2 − 1 ; (8)
q∗0 =
(2 − 3S)
2
.
q∗2 if the two ﬁrms innovate in each local market, q∗1 if one ﬁrm innovates in each local
market and q∗0 if none of them innovate. All permits price are positive if KS ≤ 23 .
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Substituting the above expressions for permit prices in (4) and (5), one obtains the levels
of emissions in all outcomes of the game, namely (E∗i (q∗2 ),E∗j (q∗2 )); (E∗l (q∗1 ),E∗−l (q∗1 )),
l = i, j, and (E∗i (q∗0 ),E∗j (q∗0 )).
It is easy to see that equilibrium emissions’ levels are always positive in the symmetric
outcomes, whereas the asymmetric outcome of the game is only deﬁned for KS ∈{ K−1
2K−1 ;
2
3
}
. It is shown in Appendix A that in the previous set of parameters, proﬁts are
positive in all the outcomes of the game. Thus, our game is deﬁned when
1 ≤ K ≤ 2 and KS ∈
{
K − 1
2K − 1 ;
2
3
}
. (9)
Most literature on environmental innovation ﬁnds that, after implementing a clean
technology, the price of permits decreases even when considering a non-competitive
setting (seeMontero, 2000). Here, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011), the price of permits after
innovation q∗1 may be higher or lower than the price without innovation. In particular,
it will be higher than q∗1 when the pair {S,K} is such that S < 23(1+K) . This threshold
makes the cap binding, restricting output production in equilibrium such that demand
is met in its region of high demand elasticity (see Sanin and Zanaj, 2011 for details).
EQUILIBRIA ANALYSIS
In this section,we identify the fulﬁlled expectations innovation andnon-innovation equi-
libria and in the following subsections we provide some comparative statics to analyze
their characteristics. Through that process, we are able to disentangle innovation incen-
tives as a function of output market characteristics and regulatory policy constraints.
FEE can be found by imposing, for each case, the expected permits price to be equal to
the realized permits price. Then,
Lemma 1 A non-innovation FEE obtains if and only if F ≥ F0(q∗0 ); a partial adoption
FEE obtains if and only if F2(q∗1 ) ≤ F ≤ F0(q∗1 ) and an innovation FEE obtains if and only
if F ≤ F2(q∗2 ), with
F0(q∗0 ) =
(3S + 2K − 2)(3S − 2)(1 − K)
9K2
;
F2(q∗1 ) =
(K2 − 3K + 3K2S + 2)(3KS − K − 1)(1 − K)
9(K2 − K + 1)2 ;
F0(q∗1 ) =
(3KS − 3K + 2K2 + 1)(3KS − K − 1)(1 − K)
9(K2 − K + 1)2 ;
F2(q∗2 ) =
(3K2S − 2K + 2)(3KS − 2)(1 − K)
9
.
(10)
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Figure 1. Map of FEE equilibria.
The previous thresholds on the ﬁxed innovation costs are non-linear functions of the
improvement in efﬁciencyK offeredby thenew technology andof the cap on emissionsS,
which together determine the elasticity of output demand at which ﬁrms are serving and
would serve the local market after innovation. They determine the values of the pairs
of {S,K} for which the increase in proﬁts in the output and in the permits market after
innovation justify, or not, to cover the ﬁxed cost F. Using the above thresholds of ﬁxed
costs (10), we build Figure 1 to display the conﬁguration of parameters where the FEE
arise.
The upper dashed curve is the curve of F0(q∗0 ) above which FEE non-innovation
equilibria arise, while innovation equilibria arise for relatively small levels of ﬁxed costs,
i.e., below the last dashed curve: F ≤ F2(q∗2 ). For intermediate levels of ﬁxed costs (area
between the two full-line curves) a partial innovation equilibrium arises. These scenarios
are result of the incentives to innovate dictated by the change in market share in the local
output market and by the cost or revenue to buy or sell permits in the global permits
market (as wewill detail in the following two subsections). FromFigure 1, it is interesting
to notice that the set of parameters where FEE partial equilibria arise shrinks as the total
number of permits issued by the authority increases. Moreover, for very high S and low
ﬁxed cost of innovation, the FEE equilibria with full innovation are also not very likely
because the for such high levels of S the corresponding output receipts for both ﬁrms is
quite low. For these levels of S and F it is worth to notice that Cournot equilibria where
the expectations of ﬁrms about permit prices are very likely to arise.
The FEE equilibria derived are unique for all relevant values of the pairs {K ,S} since
it is easy to show that F0(q∗0 ) > F0(q∗1 ) and F2(q∗1 ) > F2(q∗2 ). Importantly, it also holds
that
F2(q∗2 ) < F2(q∗1 ) < F0(q∗1 ) < F0(q∗0 ). (11)
8 Sanin and Zanaj
Then, there exists a set of parameters F ∈ {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )} ∪ {F0(q1);F0(q0)}, where
no FEE exists. In this set of parameters, the Cournot equilibrium of the production
game exists but these Cournot equilibria are not FEE.9 In these Cournot equilibria the
expectations of ﬁrms about permit prices are not fulﬁlled. In this set, there can be a
Cournot equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) depending on the expectations of ﬁrms
regarding qe. An asymmetric Cournot equilibrium arises if one of the ﬁrms believes
wrongly that q∗2 (or q∗0 ) will prevail in the global permitmarket, while the other expects q∗1 ,
which is the price that indeed prevails. The levels of ﬁxed costs corresponding to this
set are neither low enough (i.e., F ∈ {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )}) to induce the correct expectation
that an asymmetric equilibrium will prevail; nor high enough (i.e., F ∈ {F0(q1);F0(q0)})
to induce the correct expectation that a non-innovation equilibrium will prevail at the
global permit market. It is also possible that a non innovation Cournot equilibrium arises
if one ﬁrm expects q∗2 to prevail and the other expects q∗0 (and none of the ﬁrms has
incentive to innovate). In any case, these errors in expectations can be corrected in a
learning process if the interaction among ﬁrms is durable.10 A more detailed analysis of
the nonexistence of FEE is provided in Appendix B.
Non-innovation FEE
In this section, we investigate the non-innovation FEE, as stated in Lemma 1. In partic-
ular we study how the policy variable S inﬂuences the threshold F0(q∗0 ) (that leads to a
non-innovation FEE when F  F0(q∗0 )):
∂F0(q∗0 )
∂S
= 2(K − 2 + 3S)(1 − K)
3K2
< 0. (12)
The previous equation shows that, as the cap on local emissions become less bind-
ing, i.e., S increases, incentives to innovate decrease. We can then state the following
proposition
Proposition 1 A policy choice that increases the number of permits S, increases the size of
the permit (and consequently the output) market leading to a decrease in the incentives to
invest in clean technologies.
Let us now decompose the difference in proﬁts before and after innovation, in the
output market and the permits market for K → 2. In Figures 2 and 3 the dashed red
curve represents proﬁts without innovation whereas the dotted green curve represents
proﬁtswhen the ﬁrm is the only one innovating.The thick curve represents the difference
between the latter and the former situation. In Figure 2 we see that, without innovation
9 The existence of a Cournot equilibrium is guarantied by the standard concavity assumptions that
our model satisﬁes.
10 In a different setup dedicated to networks Katz and Shapiro (1985) have similar results. They also
deﬁne equilibria that are FEE and others where the expectations of consumers on the newtwork
size is not correct.
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Figure 2. Output revenues.
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Figure 3. Cost of permits.
and in an elastic demand case, as S (and consequently output production) increases,
revenues in the output market also increase. Instead, when the ﬁrm is the only one that
implements the clean technology, it becomes the larger Cournot producer and therefore
output revenues becomedecreasing inS. Such decrease is due to the provoked decrease in
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the elasticity of its residual output demand.Hence, innovation increases output revenues,
but such increase is a decreasing function of S.
Figure 3 shows the cost in the permits market if the ﬁrm is the buyer (α = 13 ).
For S sufﬁciently low (elastic demand), the price of permits increases after innovation.
Then, the buyer’s costs are higher after innovation than before (thick line is positive
for small S). Gathering Figures 2 and 3 we see that, in the case of an elastic demand,
innovation incentives in the outputmarket are counterbalancedwith the incentives in the
permitsmarket for the buyer of permits since the permits’ price increase after innovation.
Instead, it can be easily shown that incentives to innovate in the permits market are
always positive for the seller (and decreasing with S).
By ﬁxing S, the authority is indirectly capping production which determines the
elasticity of output demand in equilibrium, both with and without innovation. Thus, by
ﬁxing S the regulator determines the change in total revenue for each ﬁrm. This is also
true in the following subsection.
Innovation FEE
For an innovation equilibrium to arise the cost of implementation must be lower than the
possible increase in total revenues due to innovation, i.e., F ≤ F2(q∗2 ). Figure 4 shows the
difference in output revenues when a ﬁrm is innovating as everybody else (red dashed
curve) versus the costs when being the only one not-innovating (increasing green dotted
curve).
The threshold F2(q∗2 ) is not a monotonic function of S, in fact, it presents a maximum
at S = (2K−1)3K2 . This is due to the effect of output demand elasticity. The threshold
0.3250.30.2750.250.2250.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
-0.05
S
O-revenues
Figure 4. Output revenues.
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S = (2K−1)3K2 measures the effect of innovation on the elasticity of demand at the FEE
equilibrium after innovation. Clearly, the incentives to innovate depend on the change
of output demand elasticity before and after innovation. More precisely,
Proposition 2 When output demand is elastic ﬁrms have incentives to use the increased
efﬁciency achieved by innovation therefore incentives to innovate are positive and increasing,
allowing ﬁrms to cover a higher implementation cost F. Instead, when demand is quite elastic
ﬁrms still have positive incentives to innovate but incentives are decreasing as elasticity of
output demand decreases.
Pollution control policy covers many sectors (power, steel, aluminium, cement) with
very different market conﬁgurations. While the power sector is well-known for facing
an inelastic demand, other sectors like cement or steel are subject to international com-
petition and therefore they may face a more elastic demand. Therefore, industries with
different output markets characteristics will certainly differ in their innovation reaction
to a pollution control policy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Previous literature ﬁnds that, when the ﬁxed cost of implementation is sufﬁciently low,
innovation is always undertaken because it produces a decrease in the unit cost of pro-
duction (price of permits).11 Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that, when ﬁrms are subject
to a cap and trade regulation, innovation may produce an increase in permits’ price that
leads to a higher cost of output production. Herein we have shown that, under these con-
ditions, innovation incentives can be negative, even for low ﬁxed implementation costs.
In particular, we characterize the way ﬁrms’ strength in the output market (symmetric
versus asymmetric Cournot) interacts with ﬁrms’ position in the permits market (buyer
or seller) to determine innovation incentives.
From the policy perspective, the allocation of permits between ﬁrms determines
whether a certain ﬁrm is a buyer or a seller of permits and therefore the incentives that
each ﬁrm has in the permits market. Most importantly, the cap on emissions determines
both the incentives in the output market (through its inﬂuence on the availability of
input) and on the permits market (through its inﬂuence on permits’ price).
APPENDIX A. POSITIVITY OF PROFITS
Herein we show that in the set KS ∈ { K−12K−1 ; 23}, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are positive. To do this
we substitute the equilibrium values of permits prices in each the proﬁt functions (6). It
is straightforward to see that proﬁts corresponding to symmetric outcomes are positive
when the condition of positivity of permits price KS ≤ 23 is satisﬁed. Whereas, as far as
11 See, for example, Belleﬂamme and Vergari (2011).
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concerns proﬁts of asymmetric Cournot FEE we have
πi(1,K , q1) ≥ 0 iff α ≥ 12
( − K + 2K2S − KS + 1)2
KS( − K + K2 + 1) ( − K + 3KS − 1) (A1)
This condition always holds because
1
2
( − K + 2K2S − KS + 1)2
KS( − K + K2 + 1) ( − K + 3KS − 1) ≤ 0 (A2)
since ((3S − 1)K − 1) ≤ 0 due to positivity of permits prices.
Similarly,
πj(1,K , q1) ≥ 0 if
α ≤ ((K
2 − 2K + 1)K + ((( − 5K2 + 2K − 2)S + 6K − 4)K + 2)S)
−2S( − K + K2 + 1) ( − K + 3KS − 1) (A3)
This condition always holds because
(K3 − 5K3S2 + 2K2S2 + 6K2S − 2K2 − 2KS2 − 4KS + K + 2S)
−2S( − K + K2 + 1) ( − K + 3KS − 1) ≥ 1 (A4)
and by deﬁnition of α ≤ 1.
APPENDIX B. NON EXISTENCE OF FEE
Herein we discuss Cournot equilibria that are not FEE. Depending on the expectations
of the ﬁrms about the permit price qe, these equilibria can be symmetric or asym-
metric. Cournot equilibria that are not FEE arise in the set F ∈ {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )} ∪{F0(q∗1 );F0(q∗0 )}, which is not empty since the inequality
F2(q∗2 ) < F2(q∗1 ) < F0(q∗1 ) < F0(q∗0 ). (B1)
holds.
Let us consider different expectations of ﬁrms to see what equilibria may arise in the
set {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )}. For instance, assume that ﬁrm i expects qe = q∗2 , whereas ﬁrm j
expects qe = q∗1 . Then, ﬁrm i has no incentive to innovate if
i(Ki ,Kj , q∗2 ) − i(1,Kj , q∗2 ) < F
F2(q∗2 ) < F
while ﬁrm j has incentive to innovate in this same interval. Firm j innovates if it believes
that qe = q∗1 and
j(1,Kj , q∗1 ) − j(1, 1, q∗1 ) > F
F2(q∗1 ) > F
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Hence, in the set F ∈ {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )} the Cournot equilibrium of the game is an
asymmetric Cournot with ﬁrm j innovating and ﬁrm i not innovating, but this Cournot
equilibrium is not an FEE.
Similarly, if ﬁrm i believes that qe = q∗0 it has incentive to innovate because
i(Ki , 1, q∗0 ) − i(1, 1, q∗0 ) > F
F(q∗0 ) > F
while, if at the same time ﬁrm j expects qe = q∗1 , it has no incentive to innovate because
j(Ki , 1, q∗1 ) − j(1, 1, q∗1 ) < F
F2(q1) < F
Then, in the set F ∈ {F0(q∗1 );F0(q∗0 )}, an asymmetric Cournot that is not an FEE
prevails.
Nevertheless, in the same set of parameters, i.e., for F ∈ {F2(q∗2 );F2(q∗1 )}, it is also
possible that a non-innovation equilibrium arises. This equilibrium takes place if both
ﬁrms expect qe = q∗2 , but none has incentive to innovate and then
i(Ki ,Kj , q∗2 ) − i(1,Kj , q∗2 ) < F
F2(q∗2 ) < F
j(Ki ,Kj , q∗2 ) − j(1,Kj , q∗2 ) < F
F2(q∗2 ) < F
A non-innovation symmetric Cournot equilibrium that is not an FEE arises.
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